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Abstract
We conjecture that creativity and the perception of cre-
ativity are, at least to some extent, shaped by embod-
iment. This makes embodiment highly relevant for
computational creativity (CC) research, but existing re-
search is scarce and the use of the concept highly am-
biguous. We overcome this situation by means of a
systematic review and a prescriptive analysis of pub-
lications at the International Conference on Computa-
tional Creativity. We adopt and extend an established
typology of embodiment to resolve ambiguity through
identifying and comparing different usages of the con-
cept. We collect, contextualise and highlight opportuni-
ties and challenges in embracing embodiment in CC as a
reference for research, and put forward important direc-
tions to further the embodied CC research programme.
Introduction
Most researchers agree that creativity and intelligence are
closely intertwined (Kaufman and Plucker, 2011). More-
over, it is widely accepted that intelligence is conditioned on
embodiment (Brooks, 1991; Clark, 1998); with the words of
Pfeifer and Scheier, “intelligence cannot merely exist in the
form of an abstract algorithm but requires a physical instan-
tiation, a body” (Pfeifer and Scheier, 2001, p. 649). Without
insisting on physicality, we conjecture that creativity, as a
form of intelligent cognition, is also shaped by embodiment.
This makes embodiment highly relevant across the en-
tire continuum of computational creativity (CC) research
(Pérez y Pérez, 2018; Veale, Cardoso, and Pérez y Pérez,
2019), from engineering artificial systems that can be con-
sidered autonomously creative (Colton, 2008; Colton and
Wiggins, 2012), to understanding creativity in living be-
ings through computational modelling and simulation (Bo-
den, 2003). Here, some of the most striking questions are if
reproducing human-like creativity by computational means
is at all possible without also reproducing human embod-
iment (Guckelsberger, Salge, and Colton, 2017; Valverde-
Pérez and Negrete-Yankelevich, 2018), and how changes to
a system’s embodiment affect its potential creativity.
Unlike psychologists, whose human subjects share simi-
lar embodiments, CC researchers can go beyond investigat-
ing the effect of embodiment on creativity per se and ex-
plore how people’s perception of creativity (Colton, 2008;
Colton, Pease, and Saunders, 2018) as exhibited by an artifi-
cial system is affected by their own and the system’s embod-
iment. If such an effect existed, embodiment would have to
be considered an integral factor in the evaluation of CC (Jor-
danous, 2012) to facilitate fairer comparisons between com-
putational systems and with human creativity. Moreover,
using this knowledge, researchers could tune a system’s em-
bodiment to improve the perception of its creativity, and,
vice versa, how it perceives the creativity of others.
Given these potential ramifications, it is surprising and
alarming that “embodiment” seems to have received little at-
tention in CC research. One potential reason for the apparent
void is that the very concept is highly ambiguous (Ziemke,
2003). Theories of embodied cognition – from minimal ac-
counts that “rule out anatomy and bodily movement as im-
portant” (Gallagher, 2011), to radical approaches that under-
stand cognition as inextricably bound to bodily processes –
conceptualise embodiment differently. Moreover, embod-
ied cognition is closely associated with other, popular extra-
cranial and extra-bodily theories of cognition, in particular
theories of enactive, embedded and extended cognition. Due
to their proximity and interdependence, they are frequently
grouped together into the complex of “4E cognition”.
Crucially though, there appears to be very little awareness
of this ambiguity and complexity within CC research. At
present, it is perfectly imaginable that two researchers excit-
edly referred to the “embodiment” of their respective system
without noticing that they are talking about entirely differ-
ent things. We consider this a major problem, given that the
various types of embodiment likely have radically different
effects on (the perception of) creativity. We argue that the
advancement of the field through concerted investigations
requires the use of common definitions of embodiment.
The first goal of this paper is to counteract this ambigu-
ity and provide a rich overview of what some authors have
already coined “embodied computational creativity (CC)”
(Saunders and Gemeinboeck, 2014; Guckelsberger, Salge,
and Colton, 2017; Colton, Pease, and Saunders, 2018) re-
search. Based on a systematic review of related work at
the International Conference on Computational Creativity
(ICCC) as the prime and domain-agnostic venue of CC re-
search, we answer the following research questions:
RQ1: What types of embodiment have been embraced in





















RQ2: Why did CC researchers embrace these embodiment
types in their work, and what challenges did they face?
RQ3: What does CC research reveal about the relationship
of embodiment and (the perception of) creativity?
To counteract ambiguity in the usage of the embodiment
concept, we extend and apply a well established typology
of embodiment informed by cognitive science to assess the
specific types addressed in each relevant contribution. By
making transparent which types of embodiment have been
embraced, and by highlighting our challenges in assess-
ing them, we want to provide a frame of reference for re-
searchers to adequately and unambiguously address ques-
tions of embodiment in their work. Our insights moreover
allow us to to provide recommendations for an embodied CC
research programme – the second goal of this paper.
Types of Embodiment
Much research focuses on distinguishing theories of embod-
ied cognition (e.g. Gallagher, 2011), but comparisons of the
underlying and varying conceptualisations of embodiment
are rare. To disambiguate different uses of the embodiment
concept in CC, we adopt and extend the well-established ty-
pology by Ziemke (2003), who distinguishes six types of
embodiment informed by research in cognitive science and
robotics. We introduce three additions to this typology (one
additional type, two additions to existing types) based on
more recent insights, and highlight them in italics below.
structural coupling, characterising systems that can per-
turbate, and, vice versa, be perturbated by their surround-
ing environment (Varela, Rosch, and Thompson, 1991).
Such perturbations facilitate a minimal interaction be-
tween the system and environment, in which each has the
potential to affect the other’s state (Quick et al., 1999).
historical, characterising systems whose present state is
the result of a history of structural couplings, devel-
oped through interactions with the environment over time
(Varela, Rosch, and Thompson, 1991; Ziemke, 1999).
virtual, characterising simulated systems embedded in and
distinguished from a simulated environment. The virtual
body can act on the environment and vice versa.
physical, characterising systems with a physical body
(Brooks, 1990; Pfeifer and Scheier, 2001) that can inter-
act with the environment by being subjected to and by
exercising physical force. Most prominently, robots are
physically embodied (Pfeifer, Iida, and Bongard, 2005).
organismoid, characterising virtually or physically em-
bodied systems with the same or a similar shape and sen-
sorimotor equipment as living organisms, e.g. animals.
We consider humanoid embodiment as approximations
of the human body a subset of organismoid embodiment.
organismic, applying to living and artificial systems capa-
ble of organisational closure, i.e. of maintaining their or-
ganisation and surrounding boundary against internal and
external perturbations by means of self-producing pro-
cesses (Von Uexküll, 1920; Maturana and Varela, 1987).
A prominent, minimal example is the living cell which, in
a self-referential process, maintains its organisation, in-
cluding its membrane, against perturbations from the sur-
rounding environment (Agmon, Gates, and Beer, 2016).
We briefly justify our additions. We have complemented
physical with virtual embodiment, because AI researchers
have successfully reproduced (super-)human cognitive abil-
ities in virtual agents, embedded in e.g. high fidelity physics
simulations (Lillicrap et al., 2015) or, often more coarse,
videogame worlds (Mnih et al., 2015). Applying AI tech-
niques to virtual agents in simulated worlds rather than to
physically embodied systems allows for scalability, incre-
mental development, and rapid iteration, amongst other ad-
vantages (Kiela et al., 2016). As a corollary, we have ex-
tended organismoid embodiment to virtually embodied sys-
tems, e.g. in the form of believable game characters with a
human or animal-like appearance. We have finally extended
organismic embodiment to artificial systems. Originally re-
stricted to the biochemical domain, this type required the
capacity for autopoiesis, i.e. self-production, to facilitate a
radical form of autonomy. Varela overcomes this limitation
by introducing the concept of organisational closure as “op-
erational characterization of autonomy in general, living or
otherwise” (Varela, 1979). Froese and Ziemke (2009) advo-
cate that organisational closure can be realised by AI sys-
tems, and survey existing examples. We can thus consider
organismic embodiment in artificial systems, which makes
it relevant for CC research. Although organismic embodi-
ment is arguably the least well-established type, we include
it for its presence in existing CC theory (Saunders, 2012;
Guckelsberger, Salge, and Colton, 2017), its potential future
implications for CC, and its central role in related debates,
e.g. on agency (Polani, Ikegami, and Biehl, 2016).
In our adaptation of Ziemke’s (2003) typology, we have
dropped what e.g. Dautenhahn (1997) and Barsalou et al.
(2003) refer to as social embodiment, because it denotes the
use of different types of embodiment to facilitate social in-
teraction (Ziemke, 2003), and is thus orthogonal to, and not
at the same “atomic” level, as the other types. Metzinger
(2014) has proposed a distinction between 1st, 2nd and 3rd
order embodiment based on a system’s computational abili-
ties, corresponding to (1) physical, reactive systems without
explicit computation, (2) systems that explicitly represent
themselves as embodied agents, and (3) systems that can
consciously experience some of these body representations.
We disregard this typology as (i) it is not derived from exist-
ing work on embodied cognition more generally and serve
the specific purpose of grounding (artificial) consciousness
as one aspect of cognition, and because (ii) it would only
warrant little differentiation of existing work; most CC sys-
tems presently fall into a gap between the 1st and 2nd type.
Crucially, the extended typology is only loosely hierar-
chical. Historically as well as physically and virtually em-
bodied systems are all structurally coupled. Physically and
virtually embodied systems in turn can, but do not have to
be historically embodied. Organismoid systems can be vir-
tually or physically embodied, but we reserve organismic
embodiment to physically embodied systems, as autonomy
via organisational closure relies on physical forces that pose
a real threat to a system’s organisation and boundary.
Review Method
To investigate how embodiment has been discussed in CC
research, we performed a systematic literature review on the
proceedings of the International Conference on Computa-
tional Creativity (ICCC), the prime venue for CC research,
between its inception in 2010 and its latest edition in 2020.
We expect our findings to be representative, as ICCC gath-
ers a wide audience of CC researchers and practitioners, and
welcomes contributions covering any creative domain, cre-
ative practice and aspect of creative cognition (Association
for Computational Creativity, 2021). We constrained our re-
view to paper candidates that explicitly mention the words
“embodiment”, “embodied”, “disembodiment”, “disembod-
ied”, “embody”, or “embodying”.
We acknowledge that our reliance on the explicit usage
of the word may overlook a large amount of potentially rel-
evant papers. This particularly concerns work on robotics,
which often does not include explicit mentions of the em-
bodiment of the investigated systems. Simply including the
term “robotics” in our search however was impractical, as,
for fairness, it would have required to also include any other
type of system characterised by the remaining embodiment
types. Given the inclusiveness of some types, the amount
of potentially related papers would likely go beyond what
could reasonably be reviewed in depth. Moreover, we be-
lieve that our present approach allows us to identify inten-
tional and thus more informative discussions of the relation-
ship between embodiment and (the perception of) creativity.
For our initial candidate paper selection, we divided the
past ICCC proceedings into pdf files, each containing one
paper, short paper, demo description, or other peer reviewed
publication. We used a wildcard search in Adobe Acro-
bat reader with the phrase “*embod*” and the hyphenated
version “*em-bod*”. In total we found 99 papers men-
tioning the word “embodiment”, “embodied”, “disembodi-
ment”, “disembodied”, “embody”, or “embodying” explic-
itly, with a total of 491 matches to the search phrases.
We then reduced the candidate papers for our final, qual-
itative analysis in a two-stage process. We first excluded
papers which mentioned these words only in the References
section (7 papers), or as part of a general list of CC related
topics (2 papers). We secondly excluded papers that used
these keywords in a merely metaphorical way, such as sug-
gesting that a specific algorithm or system “embodies” cer-
tain values (51 papers). This left us with a final pool of 40
papers for in-depth analysis. Figure 1 illustrates the overall
usage of the term over the years, thus partly answering RQ1.
We assessed the embodiment of any system described in
the remaining papers, either introduced there or through ref-
erence to other work, based on Ziemke’s (2003) extended
typology. Since explicit definitions of embodiment were
mostly absent, this usually required us to look at the spe-
cific characteristics of the system in question. To answer
our research questions, we also gathered notes on:
• Which challenges did we encounter in assessing the em-
bodiment described in the paper?
• Did we identify any embodiment types that were not yet

































Papers with no mention Metaphorical use of embod* Non-metaphorical use of embod*
Figure 1: Absolute annual numbers of ICCC papers using
words derived from ‘embodiment’ in a (non-)metaphorical
way. On average, 7.1% of papers use the word ‘embodi-
ment’ or its derivatives non-metaphorically, with the lowest
proportion (0%) in 2012 and the highest (11.8%) in 2017 and
2020. Overall the term is used throughout the proceedings,
but non-metaphorical usage has increased over the years.
• Why have the authors embraced this particular type of
embodiment, and what challenges did they face? (RQ2)
• What did the paper express about the relationship between
embodiment and creativity, or between embodiment and
the perception of creativity? (RQ3)
Each of the remaining 40 papers was first assessed by one
of the four researchers participating in the effort. We then
discussed the challenges encountered, and cross-checked
each paper with another colleague in the team. Any poten-
tial disagreements were resolved in dedicated discussions.
Another four papers were removed during this step because
the explicit mentions to embodiment were cursory. This re-
duced the final number of papers to 36.
The answers to the questions presented above were anal-
ysed by building an affinity diagram, a qualitative data anal-
ysis method used to group data into emergent categories
(Rogers, Sharp, and Preece, 2011, p. 286). We first built
individual affinity diagrams from the answers collected for
each question by grouping similar items together and la-
belling them. We then merged categories between the differ-
ent questions, yielding one large affinity diagram as a con-
nected view of different aspects of embodiment in CC. We
finally identified overarching themes within this structure.
Findings
We report our findings on the state-of-the-art of embodied
CC in individual subsections. We first detail the types of
embodiment identified in existing work, thus conclusively
answering RQ1. We elaborate on our difficulties in this pro-
cess later in the discussion section, where we go beyond the
present findings and make recommendations for future re-
search. Our review uncovered that existing insights on the
relationship of embodiment and (the perception of) creativ-
ity are often tightly aligned with researchers’ motivations to
embrace a certain type of embodiment in their work. In the
second part of our findings, we consequently address RQ2
and RQ3 jointly through themes corresponding to opportu-
nities and challenges for embodied CC. We distinguish each
Embodiment Type




























































de Melo & Gratch 2010 Evolving Expression of Emotions — — G# # G# # G# G# #
Saunders et al. 2010 Curious Whispers  —   #  G# # #
Kirsh 2011 Creative Cognition in Choreography — —   #     
Gemeinboeck & Saunders 2013 Creative Machine Performance: Robotic Art  —   #  G# # #
Saunders, Chee & Gemeinboeck 2013 Evaluating Human-Robot Interaction  —   #  G# # #
Schubert & Mombaur 2013 Motion Dynamics in Abstract Painting  —  G# #  # # #
Schorlemmer et al. 2014 COINVENT: Concept Invention Theory — — # # # # # # #
Davis et al. 2014 Building Artistic Computer Colleagues  —  # # G# # # #
Jacob & Magerko 2015 Interaction-based Authoring  —    #  G# #
Takala 2015 Preconceptual Creativity  —    # # # #
Carlson et al. 2016 Cochoreo: Generative Choreography  —  #  # # # #
McCormack & d’Inverno 2016 Designing Improvisational Interfaces  —  # # # # # #
Crnkovic-Friis & Crnkovic-Friis 2016 Generative Choreography using Deep Learning  — # # # # # # #
Guckelsberger et al. 2016 Supportive and Antagonistic Behaviour       G# # #
Brown 2016 Understanding Musical Practices  —  # # # # # #
Augello et al. 2017 Creative Robot Dance With Variational Encoder  —    #   #
Fitzgerald, Goel & Thomaz 2017 Human-Robot Co-Creativity: Task Transfer  —   #    #
Guckelsberger, Salge & Colton 2017 Non-Anthropocentric Intentional Creative Agency     #     
Singh et al. 2017 Unified Classification and Generation Networks  —  #  # # # #
Colton, Pease & Saunders 2018 Issues of Authenticity in Creative Systems     #  G# # #
Hedblom et al. 2018 Under the Super-Suit: Conceptual Blending  — # # # # # # #
Saunders & Gemeinboeck 2018 Performative Body Mapping for Robots   G# # # G# G# # #
Wicke & Veale 2018 Interview With the Robot  —  G# #    #
Jacob et al. 2019 Affordance-Based Generation of Object Variants  — # #  # # # #
Onate, Mendez & Gervas 2019 Elevator Conversations Based on Emotions  — # # # # # # #
Veale, Wicke & Mildner 2019 Duets Ex Machina: “Double Acts”    # #    #
Loesel, Mirowski & Mathewson 2020 Do Digital Agents Do Dada?   G# #  G# G# G# G#
Alexandre 2020 Creativity Explained by Cognitive Neuroscience  —   #     
Chen et al. 2020 Breaking the Imitation Barrier  — # # # # # # #
Ferguson et al. 2020 Automatic Similarity Detection in LEGO Ducks  — # # # # # # #
Kantosalo et al. 2020 Modalities, Styles and Strategies — —  # #  # # #
Kantosalo & Takala 2020 Five C’s for Human–Computer Co-Creativity    # #  # # #
LaViers & Vidrin 2020 Can a Robot Do a Trust Fall? — —  # #  # # #
Savery, Zahray & Weinberg 2020 Shimon the Rapper: Robot Rap Battles  —  G# #    #
Wallace et al. 2020 Movement Generation with Audio Features  — # # # # # # #
Wicke & Veale 2020 Show, Don’t (Just) Tell  — G# # #    #
Table 1: Chronological overview of ICCC (2010-2020) papers mentioning the concept of embodiment explicitly and non-
metaphorically. The circles # G#, and  represent increasing degrees to which the described embodiment(s) match our types.
Organismoid embodiment entails humanoid embodiment, but we also discriminate humanoid embodiment separately. For
papers describing multiple embodied systems, e.g. a robot and a human, individual embodiment types were combined with a
logic “or”. Papers introducing a “concrete system” have been marked; other papers consider theory or abstract systems.
theme as a paragraph heading, point out sub-themes in bold,
and highlight which embodiment type it relies on in italics.
Embodiment Types
Table 1 provides an overview of our final paper selection,
together with our assessment of the described embodiment.
We found that structural coupling and physical embodiment
are most common, each appearing in almost twenty papers.
Historical, virtual and organismoid mentions appear quite
equally, each in about ten papers. Organismic embodiment
was only identified in four papers; Guckelsberger, Salge, and
Colton (2017) discuss it with respect to machines, while the
other three instances relate to humans, which are organis-
mically embodied by definition. Over the years, although
there is considerable variation, the annual number of papers
grows from 1.6 on average in the first half to 3.6 in the lat-
ter half of the decade, until there is a sudden peak of 10 in
2020. Mentions of different types follow a similar trend,
except that structural coupling gives way to the more spe-
cific, physical embodiment in recent years. Out of the 36
papers, 23 present a concrete, embodied computational sys-
tem, seven are at least partly theoretical or appealing to the
embodiment of humans. In another seven papers, we were
unable to identify one or multiple types of embodiment at
all, indicated by a row of empty circles in Table 1.
Our analysis highlights virtual and physical embodiment
as strongest differentiators of existing work. It moreover
identified a chasm between researchers poised to leverage
humanoid embodiment, and those rejecting it for the benefits
of other variations of organismoid embodiment.
Through our review, we identified one embodiment type
that was not directly present in our extension of Ziemke’s
(2003) typology: Loesel, Mirowski, and Mathewson (2020)
introduce “cyborg embodiment”, which bridges between
virtual, organismoid (anthropomorphic) and physical em-
bodiment. It was demonstrated in their theatrical experiment
“AI Improv”, where a chatbot provides sentences to be artic-
ulated by a human actor, and receives new prompts to react
to from a backstage operator who monitors the on-stage di-
alogue. The two people thus provide a split actuation and
sensing interface to the artificial system, allowing for it to
be embedded in the physical environment of the stage.
Opportunities of Embodied CC
Our analysis identified nine opportunities of embracing em-
bodiment in CC. We can distinguish two sub-groups, based
on how the themes relate to the concept of interaction. All
types of embodiment distinguished in our typology assume
at least a minimal form of interaction between an agent and
its environment in the form of structural coupling. The
first four themes concern how this embodiment-induced split
provides opportunities for modelling a specific creative do-
main, outsourcing computation, letting creativity emerge
and stimulating it. The remaining five themes operate on a
stronger notion of interaction between agents, i.e. where the
embodied agent’s environment comprises interaction part-
ners. In this group, embodiment is considered a means to
model co-creativity, ground meaning, facilitate more natural
interaction with people, support identification and empathy
with the computational agent, and increase the CC system’s
creative intentionality and autonomy.
Domain Necessity Any type of embodiment presents the
opportunity to model creative processes that unfold be-
tween an agent and their environment. Some creative
domains may necessitate this split more than others in or-
der to comprehensively model the creative processes within.
Dance choreography represents a prime example (Augello
et al., 2017; Carlson et al., 2016), but embodiment has also
been embraced in e.g. music (Schorlemmer et al., 2014) and
painting (Schubert and Mombaur, 2013; Singh et al., 2017)
to model creative processes that rely on sensorimotor feed-
back between an agent and their surroundings.
Outsourcing Computation Embodied CC has adopted
several premises of embodied AI more generally, notably
the use of physical embodiment to outsource computation
into the physical world. Saunders, Chee, and Gemein-
boeck (2013) note that physical embodiment allows artifi-
cial agents “to take advantage of properties of the physical
environment that would be difficult or impossible to simu-
late computationally” (paraphrasing Brooks, 1990; see also
Gemeinboeck and Saunders, 2013). They thus relate to one
of the most prominently articulated benefits of embodied AI:
the use of the world “as its own model” (Brooks, 1991).
Emergent Creativity While the outsourcing of computa-
tion seems a mere engineering benefit at first, it has ma-
jor implications for the creativity that a physically embod-
ied system can potentially exhibit. In particular, it allows
to realise the very premise of systems theories of creativ-
ity (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988), the emergence of creative
behaviour through an agent’s interaction with their en-
vironment, including other agents: “embodiment provides
opportunities for agents to experience the emergence of ef-
fects beyond the computational limits that they must work
within” (Saunders, Chee, and Gemeinboeck, 2013). In the
art installation Zwischenräume, the robots’ creative agency
“is not predetermined but evolves based on what happens
in the environment they examine and manipulate” (Gemein-
boeck and Saunders, 2013). This emergence benefits from
a controller that is not pre-coded but sensitive to an agent’s
changing embodiment. Several authors (e.g. Saunders et al.,
2010; Saunders, Chee, and Gemeinboeck, 2013; Guckels-
berger et al., 2016; Guckelsberger, Salge, and Colton, 2017)
highlight the use of computational intrinsic motivation to
this end. A system with a suitable controller can leverage
its embodiment to expand its behavioural range beyond
what can be anticipated by the system designer, realising
novelty as core criterion for creativity (Rhodes, 1961).
Stimulation of Creativity As a specific case of emer-
gent creative behaviour, several researchers argue that con-
straints imposed through embodiment can stimulate cre-
ativity. Drawing on Pickering (2005), Saunders et al. high-
light that the “world offers opportunities, as well as pre-
senting constraints: human creativity has evolved to ex-
ploit the former and overcome the latter, and in doing both,
the structure of creative processes emerge” (Saunders et
al., 2010). Guckelsberger et al. (2016) argue in an artistic
context, drawing on different embodied CC systems and a
thought-experiment on the physically embodied robot soci-
ety Curious Whispers (Saunders et al., 2010), that overcom-
ing embodiment-related constraints in an environment can
necessitate and – given a suitable agent controller – yield
creativity. Takala (2015) demonstrates this on a simulated
robotic arm capable of inventing new and useful movements
when encountering obstacles. This also highlights that cre-
ative action is possible without creative reasoning, a dis-
tinction which is later picked up by Fitzgerald, Goel, and
Thomaz (2017). By utilising virtual embodiment, Takala
demonstrates that the effect of embodiment constraints on
creativity can be investigated without physical embodiment.
However, the use of physical embodiment can better allevi-
ate doubts about the emergent behaviour being truly novel,
and not engineered a priori into a simulated environment.
Co-Creativity Many of the analysed papers express a fo-
cus on stronger forms of interaction between agents. Two
particular modes of interaction are given by human-machine
and machine-machine co-creativity (Saunders and Bown,
2015; Kantosalo and Toivonen, 2016). This focus can be ex-
plained with the observation that embodiment is a prereq-
uisite for co-creativity. Guckelsberger et al. (2016) high-
light that “co-creative and social creativity systems are only
meaningful if each agent has a different perspective on a
shared world, allowing them to complement each other, and
for creativity to emerge from their interaction”. The neces-
sary separation of agent and environment is crucially facili-
tated by any type of embodiment. This allows for the attribu-
tion of embodiment to a given system, based on the systemic
nature of the system alone. The next three themes represent
additional lenses on human-machine co-creativity.
Grounding Meaning Another central premise of more
radical theories of embodied cognition, bordering to enac-
tivism (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 2017), is that phys-
ical embodiment can overcome symbolic representations
and ground meaning in sensorimotor interaction (e.g.
Dreyfus, 1992). Colton, Pease, and Saunders (2018) stress
that this allows re-representing creative domains in action.
As an example, they refer to the Marimba playing robot Shi-
mon (Hoffman and Weinberg, 2010) which represents mu-
sic as choreography of physical gestures. They also em-
phasise the grounding of machine “life experiences” as an
important factor in increasing the perception of authen-
ticity in CC systems. Related, Wicke, Veale and Mildner
exploit robot gestures to provide the illusion of grounding
computer-generated stories (Wicke and Veale, 2018, 2020;
Veale, Wicke, and Mildner, 2019), thus leveraging embodi-
ment to affect the perception of their robot’s creativity.
Natural Interaction Saunders et al. (2010) are first to
stress that physical embodiment allows for CC systems to
be embedded in rich social and cultural environments.
This enables “computational agents to be creative in envi-
ronments that humans can intuitively understand” (Saun-
ders, Chee, and Gemeinboeck, 2013). Robotic art installa-
tions are highlighted as one means to “gain access to shared
social spaces with other creative agents, e.g., audience mem-
bers” (Gemeinboeck and Saunders, 2013). Existing research
often stresses that situating CC systems in physical space re-
alises more natural interaction by established means, and
can unleash new modes of interaction. This is explained
by physical embodiment affording tight feedback loops
(Wicke and Veale, 2018) and providing stronger cues to the
human interaction partners (Saunders, Chee, and Gemein-
boeck, 2013). In some instances, this interaction is con-
strained to a few invididuals, e.g. when situating a robot on
stage to interact with musicians (Savery, Zahray, and Wein-
berg, 2020) or actors (Loesel, Mirowski, and Mathewson,
2020). In their art installation Zwischenräume, Gemein-
boeck and Saunders in contrast open the interaction to a
wider audience in an exhibition space, permitting “the devel-
opment of significantly new modes of interaction” and “en-
gaging a broad audience in the questions raised by models
of artificial creative systems” (Gemeinboeck and Saunders,
2013). Within natural interaction spaces, physical embod-
iment can “improve the relationship between humans and
AI, inspiring humans in new creative ways” (Savery, Zahray,
and Weinberg, 2020), e.g. in partnering a human musician
with Shimon’s reincarnation as rapper.
Identification & Empathy Within the overarching theme
of agent interaction, researchers embraced physical, and in
particular organismoid and humanoid embodiment to fa-
cilitate and improve communication and, consequently,
to afford identification, empathy and affect between hu-
man and robot, or within a society of robots. Gemeinboeck
and Saunders highlight embodied action in their installation
Zwischenräume as a means for communication; it takes the
form of robots creating noises with a hammer which mem-
bers of an exhibition audience and other robots can per-
ceive and react to. They moreover stress from an enactivist
perspective that the robots’ actions provide “a window on
the agents’ viewpoint” (Gemeinboeck and Saunders, 2013),
thus possibly facilitating more introspection. Wicke and
Veale refer to work outside CC to emphasise that, “when
identification with the [story]teller is the goal, the physical
presence of a moving body with a human shape makes all
the difference” (Wicke and Veale, 2018), hence stressing the
effect of organismoid (humanoid) embodiment. Moreover,
they hypothesise that a “listener that can identify with the
storyteller is better positioned to empathize with the story
that the teller wants to convey, especially when that story
is crafted from the life experiences of the listeners them-
selves”. This reliance on life experience resonates with
Colton, Pease and Saunder’s (2018) previously mentioned
factors to improve the authenticity of CC systems.
Intentionality & Autonomy While organismic embodi-
ment is rarely addressed in the literature and typically only
through human embodiment (Kirsh, 2011; Alexandre, 2020;
Loesel, Mirowski, and Mathewson, 2020), Guckelsberger et
al. (2016) highlight that organismic embodiment realised in
artificial systems might play a central role in future CC re-
search. Their theoretical investigation sets out by consider-
ing non-artistic creativity in simple computational systems
through the lens of autopoietic enactivism (Maturana and
Varela, 1987) as adopted in the theory of enactive AI (Froese
and Ziemke, 2009). The latter theory holds that machines
with organismic embodiment can, similar to living beings,
realise an intrinsic purpose by maintaining the precarious
existence induced by this form of embodiment. It more-
over claims that this intrinsic purpose can ground intentional
agency. Guckelsberger et al. (2016) consider more specifi-
cally when organismic embodiment can ground intentional
creative agency, realising genuine creative autonomy (Jen-
nings, 2010). They argue that a machine grounds value
and novelty in creative activity through the maintenance of
their precarious identity, based on acts of self-production
and adaptation against entropic forces. The claim that in-
tentional creative agency is contingent on organismic em-
bodiment allows for additional, radical statements. Guck-
elsberger et al. (2016) argue via Dreyfus (2007) that a CC
system might have to accurately reproduce human organ-
ismic embodiment to exhibit human-like creativity with
intentional agency. Moreover, they introduce the concept
of “embodiment distance” to put forward hypotheses on the
impact of organismic embodiment on the perception of cre-
ativity: “when we evaluate the creativity of non-human sys-
tems with intentional agency, we are likely to misjudge value
in their behaviour or artefacts, or hesitate to attribute any
value at all, as our embodiment distance is too large” (Guck-
elsberger et al., 2016). This makes the mimicking of or-
ganismoid, and potentially, humanoid embodiment relevant.
Colton, Pease, and Saunders (2018) extend the concept of
embodiment distance to non-organismically embodied sys-
tems and discuss ways to overcome it to foster the perception
of creativity and authenticity in CC systems.
Challenges of Embodied CC
Our analysis exposed that many opportunities for embrac-
ing embodiment in CC have a flip-side, the impact of which
is mediated by the respective embodiment type. The identi-
fied three challenges are easily overlooked, as they are often
addressed separately from the corresponding opportunities.
Computational & Design Costs While affording a range
of opportunities, such as more natural interaction, the stimu-
lation of creativity, grounding, etc. – being embedded in our
physical world also puts high demands on [the] hardware,
software and system engineering (Saunders et al., 2010) of
physically embodied agents. Fitzgerald, Goel, and Thomaz
(2017) particularly lament the increased processing costs
due to the high dimensionality of robot sensors and actua-
tors. Gemeinboeck and Saunders summarise that “embody-
ing creative agents and embedding them in our everyday or
public environment is often messier and more ambiguous
than purely computational simulation” (Gemeinboeck and
Saunders, 2013). Especially when tempted by the oppor-
tunity to outsource computation into our physical environ-
ment, these costs must be carefully weighted.
Unpredictability Related, creative behaviour that
emerges from the interaction of any embodied agent and
their environment, especially if resulting from intrinsic
motivation, is often hard to predict (Guckelsberger et al.,
2016). This is more relevant in some application domains
than others, with many artistic domains affording unique
possibilities for playful experimentation. Across domains
however, researchers must exercise particular caution when
designing for interaction with people. Crucially, virtual
embodiment comes with more well-defined interaction
interfaces and affords more control in experiments that can
be reset and afford stronger introspection.
False Expectations Several authors express hope that or-
ganismoid, in particular humanoid embodiment can facili-
tate stronger identification, empathy and affect (e.g. Wicke
and Veale, 2018). Saunders and Gemeinboeck however
warn that humanoid robots can cause disappointment as
they “elicit human investment based on superficial and often
false social cues” (Saunders and Gemeinboeck, 2018). Ref-
erencing studies of human-robot interaction (Dautenhahn,
2013), they particularly highlight the risk of shaping hu-
man expectations in a robot’s social capabilities based on
appearance alone. As a workaround, they suggest focus-
ing research efforts on non-anthropomorphic robots, and on
generating embodied natural movement as means of identifi-
cation, instead of a similar form or sensorimotor equipment.
Discussion of Embodiment Assessment
We faced several challenges in assessing the type of embodi-
ment in the selected papers. We briefly elaborate on embod-
iment (i) classification challenges, (ii) biases, (iii) “under-”
and (iv) “over-attributions”, and (v) typology limitations.
The classification (i) of embodiment was complicated
by unspecific descriptions especially in theoretical papers.
Moreover, some papers related to several systems at once,
or exclusively addressed human rather than machine em-
bodiment. Sometimes the lack of specifics did not allow us
to gain insights into the use of embodiment in CC. Schor-
lemmer et al. (2014) for instance only appeal to embodied
cognition in a side-note. Affected contributions are listed in
Table 1 without an assessment of their embodiment type.
Biased views of embodiment (ii) were expressed when
authors only explicitly recognised embodiment in humans,
e.g. in the case of a virtual system affecting the embodiment
of a human user, or when discussing the challenges of mod-
elling human movement. An example of this can be seen in
Schubert and Mombaur (2013), who attempt to capture the
movement dynamics of human painters.
Some authors “under-attributed” (iii) embodiment in that
they leveraged a specific embodiment without explicitly re-
ferring to its type or properties. We observed this particu-
larly often for organismoid embodiment, e.g. in Saunders et
al.’s (2010; 2013) description of the Curious Whispers robot
society. Here, the robots’ bug-like, organismoid embodi-
ment is not discussed explicitly, although it may have a spe-
cific effect on the perception by a human interaction partner.
Closely related, other authors “over-attributed” (iv) em-
bodiment in that they explicitly appealed to a certain type
of embodiment without fully implementing or discussing its
required properties. For example de Melo and Gratch (2010)
describe an experiment performed on “virtual humans”, but
they are used as passive mannequins to shine light on. Given
that a simulated environment to perturb and be perturbed is
absent, we cannot even attest structural coupling. Again,
this was particularly evident for organismoid embodiment.
Limitations of our typology (v) made it challenging to
identify specific embodiment types, in particular historical
embodiment: several systems presented memory or learn-
ing capabilities, but this learning did not necessarily hap-
pen during the systems’ lifetime. This launched a discussion
amongst the authors on whether e.g. the existence of learn-
ing hardware is indicative of historical embodiment. We
eventually agreed that historical embodiment is independent
of a lifetime criterion or learning, and present if the system’s
past structural coupling has an effect on its future coupling,
e.g. when a past perception triggers a change in a virtual
or physical sensor, e.g. affecting a camera’s angle, thus in-
fluencing future perceptions. Organismoid embodiment was
also difficult to assess, as the proximity of a system in shape
and sensorimotor equipment to living beings is a continuum.
Given the focus of many systems on humanoid embodiment,
it would have been helpful to consider it a separate type.
Some types of embodiment turned out to be worse at dif-
ferentiating and distinguishing existing work and insights
than others, but this does not necessarily disqualify them
from future use. Structural coupling for instance is the most
inclusive type of embodiment and applied to almost all re-
viewed systems, in particular to any physical object; yet,
it proved valuable for sanity-checking whether a simulated
system can be considered embodied at all. Organismic em-
bodiment in contrast was the most exclusive type. We think
it should be included nonetheless, given that existing theo-
retical work (Guckelsberger, Salge, and Colton, 2017) as-
signs it a major role in future CC research, e.g. on creative
autonomy. As for any other type, the current lack of dif-
ferentiating power might indicate an under-appreciation in
existing work, rather than a weakness of the type itself.
Directives for Embodied CC Research
Our analysis supports the hypothesis which motivated this
systematic review in the first place: creativity in artificial
systems, and how it is perceived, is affected by embodiment.
If we assume this hypothesis, then furthering our insights
into embodied CC will play a critical role in advancing the
goals of CC more generally. However, existing research is
highly fragmented and ambiguous, lacks generalising empir-
ical results, and rarely trades-off the opportunities and chal-
lenges of a certain type of embodiment. We translate find-
ings from our review on RQ1, RQ3 and RQ2 into three di-
rectives as pillars of a future embodied CC research agenda.
Clarify embodiment: Our review highlighted that many
opportunities and challenges of embodied CC are exclusive
to a specific type of embodiment. However, we experienced
serious difficulties in assessing the specific type of embodi-
ment embraced in existing work, as documented in the cor-
responding papers. In order to establish an efficient, unam-
biguous, verbal and written scientific discourse on embodied
CC, we urge researchers to always clarify what specific em-
bodiment they appeal to in a particular theoretical or applied
project. To this end, adopting definitions from typologies as
presented here may serve as a shortcut, foster comparison,
and alleviate the “under-” or “over-attribution” of a certain
embodiment. However, any typology can be contested and
lacks detail; references to specific embodiment types should
thus always be complemented with extensive descriptions.
To counteract the fragmentation of research output, we
recommend to reference embodiment-related work exten-
sively. This review, albeit non-exhaustive, might serve as
a starting point to identify relevant work.
Conduct empirical studies: Our review moreover uncov-
ered that no existing CC study produced generalising, em-
pirical insights about the effect of embodiment on (i) an
artificial system’s creativity, and (ii) how its creativity is
perceived by others, including humans. Researchers either
make assumptions on this relationship, or draw on exist-
ing empirical findings from other fields that may not easily
translate to computational systems (e.g. Brown, 2016). We
recommend to conduct qualitative and quantitative empiri-
cal studies on the impact of a specific embodiment, treated
as independent variable, on (the perception of) creativity.
Informed by our analysis of which embodiments differen-
tiated existing work most, we recommend that initial empir-
ical studies should investigate virtual and physical, or hu-
manoid and other variations of organismoid embodiment, as
values of the independent variable.
In evaluating the perception of creativity (ii) as depen-
dent variable, experimenters must eliminate or weight for
creative ability (i). Vice versa, in evaluating creative ability
(i), they must avoid bias by the perception of creativity (ii),
e.g. by employing objective measures of creativity (Ritchie,
2007). When employing subjective measures, researchers
should consider concepts introduced in the literature such
as the embodiment gap (Guckelsberger, Salge, and Colton,
2017; Colton, Pease, and Saunders, 2018) between the sys-
tem and its evaluator(s) as mediating variable.
Trade-off opportunities and challenges: We encourage
researchers to eventually make use of these empirical in-
sights for the design of systems that reliably leverage a cer-
tain embodiment as a means to an end, e.g. to accurately
model creative processes that emerge from sensorimotor in-
teraction in a specific domain. Crucially though, our re-
view showed that most embodiment-related opportunities
come with a challenging flip-side. In order to avoid an un-
favourable trade-off, we recommend researchers to always
inform their choice of a particular embodiment not only by
its opportunities, but also by the corresponding challenges.
Conclusions and Future Work
Motivated by the potential impact of embodiment on cre-
ativity and its perception in artificial systems, we set out to
map the present landscape of embodied computational cre-
ativity (CC), and offered directions for future research in
this area. To this end, we conducted a systematic review of
papers presented at the International Conference on Com-
putational Creativity (ICCC) that explicitly discuss embod-
iment. To counteract ambiguity in the concept’s use, we
adopted a well-established embodiment typology, and ex-
tended it based on the recent scientific debate. We found
that most existing work can be differentiated by its focus on
virtual vs. physical, and, more fine-granularly, on humanoid
vs. non-humanoid, organismoid embodiment. Moreover, we
showed that each type comes with its unique opportunities
and challenges as flip-sides of the same coin. Overall, we
identified nine opportunities, e.g. the outsourcing of compu-
tation or support for more natural interaction, and three chal-
lenges, e.g. unpredictability and the shaping of false expec-
tations, from existing studies. We identified several short-
comings of existing work that likely hinder progress on em-
bodied CC research, most prominently ambiguity in the use
of the embodiment concept and a lack of dedicated empiri-
cal research. We leverage these insights in our final contri-
bution: three directives to advance embodied CC research.
While we chose the scope of this study to provide a rea-
sonably unbiased, big-picture view of embodied CC, future
work should be dedicated to incorporating additional, rele-
vant references. How to meaningfully constrain the scope is
an open question, as relevant work can not only be found
in be found in CC books, but also related fields such as
videogame AI, robotics, design and art. To allow for fairer
and more direct, unambiguous comparisons, we moreover
suggest to complement the present review methods with in-
terviews, in which researchers in embodied CC are asked
directly to describe the embodiment in their concrete system
or theory. We also deem it worthwhile to conduct a separate,
deeper investigation of embodiment in co-creative systems
and creative system societies, drawing on theories of embod-
ied, embedded, extended and enactive social cognition (e.g.
Barsalou et al., 2003; Dautenhahn, 1997; De Jaegher and
Di Paolo, 2008), and on embodied interaction (e.g. Dourish,
2001) as well as embodied aesthetics research (e.g. Scar-
inzi, 2015). Together with these extensions, our review
and the extended typology could eventually benefit a lon-
gitudinal analysis of embodied CC, identifying trends in
the attitudes towards using specific embodiment types and
their associated opportunities and challenges over time and
across venues. We hope that this paper provides the nec-
essary knowledge, inspiration, and guidance to drive future
research on embodied computational creativity (CC).
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